There is considerable debate over the appropriate role for tax policy in developing economies. In one view, tax hikes reduce deficits and ease budgetary pressures, thereby encouraging long-term growth. An alternative view emphasizes the distortionary effects associated with increased taxation and the positive benefits of a carefully designed tax system. This paper tests these propositions by measuring the impact of government taxation and expenditure on aggregate output growth. A theoretical model is derived which shows that the impact of tax distortions on output growth is usually negative. The theoretical model is tested using a pooled cross-section time-series data set for 31 sub-Saharan African countries during 1965-73 and 1974-82. The regressions imply that the positive benefits of government investment during 1965-73 outweighed the distortionary effects of taxes necessary to finance them. By 1974-82, however, the marginal productivity of government investment had fallen; tax-financed public investment was predicted to have reduced output growth. The empirical results also imply that a revenue neutral shift from the import, corporate, and personal tax to a sales/excise (or consumption) tax will encourage output growth.
expenditures, public and private capital accumulation, and sectoral tax distortions are derived in a theoretical model, and estimated using pooled cross-section time-series data for sub-Sahara Africa during 1965-82.
Any study which attempts to relate government fiscal policies with output growth rates must confront the theoretical problem that while taxes and an inefficient government sector may reduce the level of GDP, it it is not clear that the rate of growth of GDP should be affected. Lucas (1985) , and Manas-Anton (1985) have emphasized that taxation and (most) government policy will have no effect on long-term growth rates. The first question to be addressed, then, is why should tax rates affect output growth rates?
The answer is that static tax distortions do affect output growth along a transition path --or a sequenced change in the level of output --by encouraging the flow of investment and labor supply into sectors which largely escape taxation. The expansion of these lightly taxed (or even subsidized) sectors will lead to lower sector-specific capital and labor productivity. Hence for a given rate of investment and labor supply growth, output growth is likely to decline. If the economy is on a steady-state growth path (although this seems unlikely in Africa), taxation will have no effect. Alternatively, if the lightly-taxed sectors provide positive benefits (e.g., industrial production for export, or which substitutes for imports), then taxes which direct more resources into these socially productive activities can augment output growth rates.
Ultimately, the effect of taxation on output growth is an empirical question.
While Landau (1983 Landau ( , 1986 ) has found an often negative impact of the level of government spending on growth rates, Ram (1986) has emphasized that the change in government spending is the theoretically correct factor in explaining a change in output. Regressions which follow Ram's formulation indicate that during the period 1965-73, the high marginal return from government investment more than offset the distortionary costs of taxation. During the sharp economic downturns of 1974-82, however, the regression coefficients suggest that public investment did not contribute to GDP growth; hence a tax-financed increase in government investment equal to 5 percent of GDP is predicted to have reduced output growth by nearly 0.6 percentage points. The productivity of private investment remained relatively constant during both periods.
The average increase in tax effort by the Sub-Sahara African countries between 1965-73 and 1974-82 is predicted to have reduced output growth, even after accounting for the positive effects of the additional government spending. However, this is not to suggest that all tax instruments are equally inefficient. Personal and corporate tax rates, for example, are estimated to have a significant and negative direct effect on output growth. Trade taxes have little direct effect on output growth --holding private investment constant --but they are predicted to reduce investment and thereby indirectly attenuate output growth rates. Finally, sales and excise taxes are found to be generally neutral with respect to both output growth and investment. These results have two implications. The first is that government expenditures financed by sales or excise taxation may have a positive effect on output growth. The second is that a revenue-neutral shift from trade and direct taxes to sales or excise taxation can increase output growth rates.'
The traditional view of direct versus indirect taxation is that direct taxes creates dynamic distortions by reducing savings and investment, while indirect taxation leads to static distortions. The results presented below suggest a different view. Direct taxes are estimated to cause a "static" distortion, while trade taxes are predicted to reduce investment. These results can be explained by noting that developing countries often concentrate direct taxation on a very limited number of large-scale firms (such as those in manufacturing and mining); if in turn these taxes are passed along to the output price (as suggested by Brent, 1985) , the direct tax could resemble a "static" excise tax. Similarly, companies may be discouraged from investing because of heavy export taxes on processed outputs, or the taxation of intermediate imports.
The remainder of the paper is organizeu in the following way. Section II discusses previous studies of tax distortions, shortcomings of crosscountry regression models, and the econometric growth model. Section III presents the regression results, while Section IV concludes. An appendix is also provided which discusses aspects of the theoretical model in more detail.
II. The Theoretical Model
It is useful to review three approaches to the issue of how tax policy affects output growth. The first adopts a neoclassical growth model, most 1This model cannot assess the distributional impact of such a tax change. commonly with a single good and with infinitely-lived individuals (Lucas, 1985; Mnas-Anton, 1985) . In such a model, taxes have no effect on output growth in the long-run since steady-state output growth is determined by exogenous factors such as population growth and technological change.
During the transition path between the two steady-state equilibria, growth rates will be affected. Lucas (1985) suggests that the fundamentally "static" tax distortions might account for only 0.5 percentage point differences in growth rates along the transition path.
However, a 0.5 percentage point jump in annual growth rates would have represented a 90 percent improvement over the average real per capita growth rates in Sub-Sahara Africa during 197482.2
There is little reason to believe that African (or other) countries are in steady-state equilibrium. Only 5 sub-Sahara African countries had achieved independence before 1960, and regime changes will presumably lead to differing growth paths. Furthermore, the transition path is lengthy; the "grand traverse" of the U.S. from a low capital intensity to a high capital intensity economy took most of the 19th century (David, l977) . A model which allows for the possibility of transition paths seems appropriate for the analysis of developing economies.
A second approach uses computable general equilibrium (CGE) models of specific countries to test the effect of static tariff or sectoral tax 2Thjs represents an unweighted average per capita growth rate.
3Life cycle simulation models also suggest a transition path in excess of 30 years (Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner, 1983; Seidman, 1984). inefficiencies.4 These models compare the output (or income distribution) of an economy using baseline parameters with the outcome using the counterfactual alternative policy parameters. One drawback of these models is that parameters necessary for policy recommendations, such as the impact of government spending and investment on sectoral output, are not always estimable. The dynamic specification of these simulation models presents a particular problem (see Chamley, 1983) .
The third alternative approach compares tax policy and country growth rates in cross-section empirical analysis. For example, Marsden (1983) matched ten high-tax countries, such as Zambia, Britain, Chile, and Zaire, with 10 low-tax countries such as Singapore, Korea, Uruguay, and Japan. He found in comparing the 20 countries that higher overall tax effort led to lower output growth. Two disadvantages with this study are the lack of an underlying theoretical model, and the subjective procedure by which countries are matched together.
A number of studies have used cross-country regressions to measure the impact of government expenditures and taxation on output growth. Martin (n.d.) found that while tax effort (the ratio of tax revenue to GDP) depressed output growth, deficits reduced it by even more, suggesting that tax hikes could, by cutting back deficits, encourage output growth rates.5 4See Henderson (1982) , Taylor and Black (1974), and DeMelo (1978) for simulation models of developing countries, and Fullerton, King, Shoven, and Whalley (1981) for a model of the United States.
5The causality between deficits and output growth is not clear. Countries typically run deficits during economic downturns and surpluses during economic booms. Under this interpretation, declining GDP growth rates would "cause" deficits, and not conversely.
He also found that income/corporate and trade/indirect taxes (defined as ratios of the specific tax revenue to GDP) reduced output growth. Landau (1983 Landau ( ,1986 ) has performed extensive cross-country regressions to measure the impact of government expenditures, revenue, and deficits on output growth. While some components of goverrinient spending may have had a positive effect on GDP growth rates, the combined effects of taxation to finance the expenditures, and crowding-out of private investment, usually offsets any positive effects. The question remains why a large and inefficient government sector should necessarily affect the growth rate, rather than simply the level, of GDP.
To address this theoretical difficulty, Ram (1986) derived an expression for output growth as a function of growth rates in government spending. He found a strong, positive impact of government current consumption on output growth. The goal of this section is to build on work by Robinson (1971 ), Feder (1983 , and Ram (1986) , to develop a theoretical framework for measuring the impact of taxation, government expenditures, capital, and labor supply on output growth, and to test this model using empirical data.
Before deriving the model, it is useful to review some shorcomings of cross-country regression analysis. The usual criticism of these comparisons is that countries are sufficiently dissimilar that they cannot be pooled together in a single data set; it makes little sense to interpret regression estimates based on, e.g., France and Burundi. While this paper restricts its attention to Sub-Sahara Africa, the criticism is a general one for all regressions --do the observations, whether of individuals, countries, or years, behave according to a similar structural model? If yes, then the reported regression results will provide estimates of the average, or representative parameters values. If not, the diversity should be readily reflected in insignificant regression coefficients.
A second, more serious, problem with any regression is the possibility that measured independent variables proxy for the true, but unmeasured, factors which determine output growth. For example, countries with large mining sectors often rely heavily on corporate taxation. Downturns suffered by some mining industries during 1974-82 could therefore have led to a measured, but spurious, negative effect of corporate taxation on output growth. To correct at least partially for this problem, the regressions include non-government variables which affect output growth, such as whether the country produces oil or mining outputs.
An additional problem is the proper measurement of effective tax rates. Developing countries often rely on non-tax constraints such as industrial licenses, foreign-exchange and price controls, quotas, and marketing boards, all of which cannot be reflected in standard measures of tax rates. If the measured tax rates are inaccurate, then the regression results will indicate little or no role for these measured tax rates in determining output growth.
The most serious shortcoming of cross-country regression models is the potential endogeneity of the independent variables. Rapidly-growing countries may also experience high investment rates and government spending. While the 9-year accounting framework adopted by this paper corrects in part for for short-run endogeneity in the independent variables, correcting for longer-term endogeneity is far more difficult.
To simplify the theoretical analysis, I assume that the output of the economy is comprised of an untaxed (or, more generally, a lightly-taxed) sector and a taxed sector. For example, the untaxed sector might include services, small-scale production, the informal sector, and smaliholder agriculture. The government sector is included in the untaxed sector because the payroll taxes assessed on government wages are simply returned to the government, so the government pays only net wages. The taxed sector includes large-scale manufacturing and export industries.
In many countries, the distinction between the two sectors is not sharp. The smallholder agricultural sector, for example, will escape the payroll (i.e., personal) and corporate tax, but the marketing board may impose an implicit output tax by paying farmers less than world prices.
Let the taxed sector be x, and the untaxed n. Output (or GDP) is
where P and P are the (fixed) prices to retailers or consumers in the n x untaxed and taxed sectors, respectively, and Q and are the equivalent quantities produced in each sector.
Value added in each sector is affected by government investments in infrastructure and other projects, and by government spending for current services. Let output in each sector be a function of these government activities, plus private inputs; 
by Ram (1986) , C is included in both sectors owing to possible external effects of government activity. Additionally, government capital, which appears as a "public good" in each production function, may affect output differently from private capital.
Many developing countries rely heavily on commodity taxes such as import, export, and sales taxation. The primary impact of each of these taxes is to drive a "wedge" between the producer price and consumer price of the output. In the case of sales or excise taxes, the tax would usually affect domestically produced goods, while export taxes would affect largescale exports. Import taxes might provide a subsidy for domestic importsubstituting industries, thereby artificially attracting resources into the "taxed" sector. For the purpose of the two-sector model presented below, assume that a single commodity tax, ty is imposed on the taxed sector.
Output taxes can be shifted forward, though higher consumer prices, or shifted backwards, through a reduction in wages and interest rates. If the CDP price deflator is calculated properly, the consumer price distortion (or forward-shifting) of an excise tax should reduce CDP, since the value of the distorted consumption bundle, evaluated at factor prices, is less than the value of the undistorted consumption bundle. The derivations that are presented below focus less on consumption distortion, and more on production distortions by backward-shifted taxes, although the empirical estimation procedure is perfectly general with respect to the incidence of the tax. Regression coefficients measure the combined impact of the tax (whether forward-or backward-shifted) on output growth.
Direct taxes such as the corporate and income tax will also affect the allocation of investment and labor supply. The income tax is a combination of a payroll tax on wages and an interest income tax, while the corporate tax is imposed only on corporate accounting profits, and hence falls (nominally) on capital. In combination, these two taxes drive varying degrees of "wedges" between the gross and net interest rate and wage rate.
Like the output tax t, the tax on capital, tk and the tax on labor, t may be shifted back onto wages and interest rates, or forward onto higher consumer prices for the outputs. There is a strong equivalence between the two taxes; the combined tax wedge between the net and gross return on capital is rk 1 -
(lt)(ltk)
and for labor, r = 1 -
(l-t)(l-t).
That is, a 10 percent tax commodity tax has the same effect on incentives as a 10 percent tax on capital and labor (if there are profits, the commodity tax will raise more revenue). In the model below, the "capital" tax rk and the "labor" tax are used to summarize the combined distortions of direct and indirect taxes, although in the empirical section, each tax instrument will be entered separately.
are in fixed supply, but the share of the input in each sector depends on the vector of taxes r = (rk,r};
where uk(T) and p(r) are the shares of K and L, respectively, in the untaxed sector. Next, a linear approximation of equation (1) is taken to derive a measure explain output growth. With the difference operator denoted by Li, and prices P and P set to 1.0 without loss of generality, the change in output is written
where F. and H., j=k,,K,g are production function derivatives with respect to the four inputs: private capital, labor, government capital, and government consumption. The interpretation of each coefficient is straightforward. The parameter -y measures the combined shift in output of both sectors caused by a one-unit increase in the stock of government capital. Similarly, g measures the combined or "externality" effect on sectoral output of government consumption (e.g., government services).
The parameters and measure the average of the gross (or social)
marginal factor productivity of capital and labor, weighted by the input shares in the untaxed and taxed sectors. Rearranging 3k and j3 yields:
(r) = 2(r) + (F-H1)[dp/dr](r-r)
where r is the average, or representative tax vector for the country sample, and dpk(r)/dr and d,a(r)/dr are 2x1 matrices measuring the (linear)
impact of the country-specific tax vector r on the share of capital, and of labor, in the untaxed sector. That is, each country-specific coefficient and consists of a measure of marginal productivity /3(r) which is comnion to all countries, plus an addition term which measures the tax-induced effects on aggregate marginal productivity. This second term has a straightforward interpretation: the change in the share of capital and labor flowing out of the taxed sector and into the untaxed sector, times the difference in marginal productivity of the untaxed versus the taxed sector. For example, if a high tax rate on capital caused the share of new capital (or equivalently, investment), in the taxed sector to fall by 5 percent, total capital productivity would change by 5 percent times the difference between the marginal return to capital in the taxed, and in the untaxed, sectors. To the extent that the after-tax returns to each factor tend towards equilization, the gross return Hk or H1 is likely to exceed the gross return Fk or F1. Given Hk > Fk, and H1 > F1, and making the assumption that the "own price" effect of a tax on capital or labor reduces its share in the taxed sector; aPk/ark, 8p1/8r1 > 0, it is clear that the second terms on the RHS of (5) imply that increasing Tk or reduces the marginal productivity of capital or labor, respectively.
While I have argued above that the difference in marginal productivity, Fk -Hk, and F1 -H1, are negative, the existence of external or "spillover" effects can lead to positive values (Feder, 1983) . However, with a large number of tax rates, and possible errors in measurement for I, L, and the effective tax rates, it may also be useful to consolidate the interactive tax terms into a linear expression, either for each individual tax rate, or for an overall measure of the tax "burden"
given by the ratio of tax revenue to GDP; 
Hg(lTy)
That is, the coefficients with astericks measure the after-tax factor productivity, whether for private returns and or for government "external" effects and Note that the net returns to government programs need only subtract the output tax Ty since they do not affect the taxes paid on factors, rk and r. A coefficient b on the revenue term is introduced to allow for the imperfect linkage between tax collections and measured "constant price" GDP.
Even net labor and capital productivity are likely to depend on the tax vector r. Given a fixed level of capital, a capital tax in sector x will reduce the net return on capital when labor is held constant (aithought the problem becomes more complicated when labor is allowed to * * vary; Harberger, 1962) . Hence a and continue to be written as functions of r, and interactive terms involving I/Y and r, and L and r, will continue to be used in the empirical section. Strictly speaking, the * *.
impact of r on a and j3 is a second-order effect; hence squared terms involving capital and labor should also be included in the regressions.
Empirical results which include these squared terms sharply reduce degrees of freedom, but have little effect on the other coefficent estimates.
In the next section, the model is generalized to include trade taxes, personal taxes, and sales or excise taxes, and the derivation of appropriate tax bases is discussed. Additional factors which may have affected output growth during the period are also explored.
III. Empirical Implementation of the Theoretical Model
The assumption of a two sector model is an obvious simplification, and it is shown in the appendix that the results derived above carry over to many sectors. Corporate and personal taxes will likely affect the manufacturing and mining sectors, while the import tax is expected to provide protection for import-substitution industries. The export tax will affect export industries, while the sales/excise tax may distort the use of market goods versus home production. Each tax is entered separately in the regressions to reflect potentially different effects on output growth. The tax rates required for the empirical estimation are discussed as follows.
Import Tax: The most straightforward tax to calculate is the import tax, defined to be the ratio of import tax revenue to total imports. Error may be involved measuring this tax, since imports for government or foreign aid use may not be taxed, while non-tax exchange constraints could lead to unmeasured "shadow" tax rates. Personal Tax: The personal or individual tax is typically a payroll tax, often for workers in larger establishments, and for government workers. Thus the assumed personal tax base is the manufacturing sector plus government consumption (which proxies for the government wage-bill).
The tax base will be biased upward to the extent that not all manufacturing is subject to payroll tax,' but biased downward since some export-oriented firms are subject to taxation.6
Sales Tax: The sales and excise tax is calculated as the ratio of sales and excise taxes to manufacturing value added plus imports, reflecting the usual targets of sales and excise taxes; imported goods and domestically manufactured products.
Tax Effort: The tax effort is the average ratio of tax revenue to 6While government workers are assumed to be in the untaxed sector (since taxes collected are paid back into the government) the proper calculation of the tax rate in the taxed (private) sector requires that government consumption be included in the tax base.
DP. Tax effort can proxy for the overall level of tax distortion (as in Marsden, 1983) . Alternatively, a higher tax effort conditional on fixed marginal tax rates could also reflect an expansion of the effective tak base when more revenue is collected at the same tax rates.
Additional Inflation: The inflation rate is measured as the average annual growth rate in the GDP deflator. This variable is used in the investment regressions to proxy for a measure of real interest rates. If nominal rates are fixed, higher inflation rates could lead both to lower real borrowing costs, and higher returns to physical capital accumulation.
Other Variables: It is important to control for as many additional non-tax factors as possible that may affect the output of the economy. For 7There is an alternative procedure for calculating K/Y, which is to accumulate real investment over the 9 year period, and then divide by the initial year GDP. However, such a procedure introduces simultaneity bias, since even if all countries had constant investment to GDP ratios, countries which happened to enjoy high growth rates would also experience a higher ratio of accumulated investment to initial GDP, leading to a spurious correlation between capital accumulation and output growth.
example, a sharp decline in the terms-of-trade will lead to a fall in real GDP, independent of the tax system or of investment behavior. Similarly, countries which discovered and exploited oil resources (The Congo, Gabon, Cameroon, and Nigeria) are likely to have enjoyed higher growth rates through 1982, conditional on factor inputs and tax policy. Political instability can disrupt economic growth both through the destruction of property and capital, the flight of skilled workers, and the loss of new investment (Schneider and Frey, 1985; Stewart and Venieris, 1985) . A variable measuring the number of "successful" coups during the period is included (Griffiths, 1984) . Although coups are potentially endogenous (declining economic fortunes spur coup attempts), Wheeler (1984) finds that political disruption Granger-causes output changes, but not conversely. In the next section, sources of data are described, and regression results are reported.
IV.
Empirical Results
The data set described below will be used to estimate both the output growth model developed in Section III, and also to estimate investment demand equations. The data come from national accounts and government financial statistics. To abstract from short-term fluctuations, income growth is averaged over 9 years, 1965-73 and l97482.8 The period 1973-74 represents a significant transition for many countries from relatively stable growth to uneven development as rising oil prices and worldwide 81n a few countries, 1974-81 growth rates were calculated; for Somalia, 1974-79 rates were measured.
recessions led to declining export prices and increased debt. Although some export prices rose later in the 1970s, the second oil price increase in 1979-80, subsequent economic slumps, and increasing debt burdens all led to increasing stress on government tax collection efforts. Despite these downturns, government investment during 1974-82 was high relative to the previous period (Shalizi, Ghandi, and Ehdaie, 1985) . Overall tax effort increased for Sub-Sahara African countries during this period, although stepped-up government expenditures more than offset the additional revenue, leading to increased deficits (Shalizi, Ghandi, and Ehdaie, 1985) .
Wheeler (1984) used a number of variables to explain the economic downturns in many Sub-Saharan African countries. Important factors were outbreaks of violence (or more exactly, years of peace), the terms of trade, the diversity of exports, whether the country exported minerals, the existence of foreign exchange controls, and a "habit" parameter that measures how imports respond to declines in foreign exchange. While the results presented below do not include all of his explanatory variables, they do generally confirm the effects of political instability and terms of trade on output growth. A study by Kormendi and McGuire (1985) which used data from both developed and developing economies, suggest that other variables, such as the variability in money growth, the growth in exports, and the standard deviation of real output growth, can also explain differences across countries in output growth rates.
The sample of countries was selected by including all those which reported complete information on tax, output, and investment variables. A total of 56 observations remained; 27 countries from 1965-73 and 29 countries from l974-82. This pooled cross-section time-series data set compares the growth experience of similar countries over time, and provides a larger number of observations than a simple cross-section data set. For some coefficients, such as the marginal product of capital, interactive terms are introduced which allow marginal productivity to differ across periods. Table 1 presents regression results for the model in which taxes are entered linearly rather than interactively. Column (1) describes an output growth equation similar to that estimated by Ram (1986) . Government investment is estimated to be highly productive during the period 1965-73; its marginal productivity is estimated to be a substantial 0.534, which is significant at the .10 level, and larger than the corresponding marginal productivity for private investment. However, the dummy variable for the period 1974-82 interacted with public investment (Public Investment 74-82)
indicates a dramatic fall in the productivity of government capital during this latter period --from .532 to -.077. By contrast, the marginal productivity of private capital exhibited no consistent change during this 10 period.
91n 1965-73, the countries were Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, and Zaire. In 1974-82, the Gambia, Guinea, Niger, and Zambia were included, while Madagascar and Gabon were dropped.
10The interpretation of the private and public investment coefficients as "marginal productivities" is consistent with a production function model in which output depends, in the long run, on the supply of inputs. In a traditional Keynesian model, autonomous investment will be a function of Y, which reverses the causal relationship posited above. I hope to correct for this reverse causation by (i) using a Column (2) provides a simple measure of cumulative tax distortions with the use of Tax Effort which is interacted with Private Investment and with Population (this is roughly equivalent to assuming that rk = ri). (2) predicts that a permanent three percent increase in G/Y financed by increasing the tax effort will reduce output growth rates by 0.3 percentage points, although this prediction is not significant at conventional levels.
The third column once again uses Tax Effort to proxy for the overall degree of tax distortions, although in this case it is entered linearly, as in (9), rather than interactively. The coefficient is negative and significant.
Column (4) expands the regression to include different measures of tax nine-year period, and (ii) using I/Y to measure investment, so that an increase in Y which causes an autonomous, equal percentage increase in I will have no effect on the independent variable. Even for the case in which investment is exogenous, it is still not clear whether the coefficients measure a "multiplier" effect or a marginal productivity. The implication of policies which either reduce the marginal productivity, or dampen the "multiplier", are similar --they reduce output growth rates.
11The sample means of Ig/Y and L are 11.5 and 2.7 percent, respectively. The effect of a 5 percent increase in tax effort is therefore 5(-.005x11.5 +-.048x2.7). The test of joint significance of both coefficients is significant at the 0.08 level. While the taxation t-statistics are insignificant, they are irrelevant for testing the hypothesis that taxation is important.
distortion. The tax rates are entered linearly (Table 2 below presents results using the interactive specification of equation (8)). The most notable aspect of these equations is the significant and negative impact of direct taxation (corporate and personal) on output growth rates. A 1 percentage point increase in the personal tax (equivalent to a 17 percent increase in personal tax rates) is predicted to reduce output growth rates by 0.36 percentage points. The coefficients for the import, export, and sales taxes, however, are insignificant, with coefficients near zero.
The possibility that mineral exporting countries (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Zaire, Guinea, and Zambia; see Wheeler, 1984) subject to high corporate tax rates suffered output downturns because of trade-related problems rather than high corporate tax rates was tested by including a minteral exporting dummy variable. The regression (not reported) showed only minor differences in the taxation coefficients. Landau (1983; has suggested that the ratio of government consumption to GDP, G/Y, be entered as a component in GDP growth rates.
While it is difficult to justify its inclusion on a theoretical basis (as discussed in the previous section), it is included nonetheless in the final ttportmanteautt regression in Table 1 . The coefficient on G/Y is negative and significant, suggesting that this ratio may itself proxy for other factors, such as an active regulatory presence, that affects growth rates adversely. Table 2 presents regression results when the tax rates are interacted both with capital accumulation and with population (or labor supply) growth. The coefficients on these interacted terms are interpreted as the effect of a one percentage point increase in the tax rate on the marginal product of capital, or of labor. To begin, column (1) in Table 2 When the tax variables are interacted with both capital and labor growth (colunin 2), it appears that the t-statistics on the corporate and personal tax are no longer significant. However, the test of whether the individual taxes are significance is given by the combined effect of a given tax on both labor and capital productivity. Evaluated at the sample means, these linear combinations are significant and negative, indicating, as above, that the effect of the corporate and personal tax on output growth is negative and significant at the 0.05 level; other tax measures are insignificant.
Finally, the third column in Table 2 presents coefficient estimates of the net return to factor inputs, along the lines of equation (11). The estimated effects of the different tax instruments are similar to those reported in column (2). The coefficient on the weighted tax variable () is similarly significant, and close to one in value.
As noted previously, there are two paths by which taxes can affect income growth. The first is through the productivity of inputs, as the regressions above have been attempting to measure. The second is through the supply of factors; higher tax rates may reduce labor supply and the supply of investment.
A regression which explains private investment for the sample is presented in column 1 of Table 3 . In this first regression, tax variables are excluded; coups have a signficant negative effect on investment, while oil producing countries tended to have investment rates 7.5 percentage points above non-oil producing countries. In addition, the impact of government consumption (e.g., government current expenditures) on investment appears to be positive and significant.
When tax variables are included (column 2) a different story emerges.
The effect of government consumption drops from 0.386 (in column 1) to an insignificant 0.028, conditional on overall tax effort. Furthermore, import taxes, export taxes, and corporate taxes all exhibit strong negative effects on investment behavior. The rises from .292 to .559 with the introduction of these tax variables.
The corporate tax is likely to reduce equity investment since the tax assessed against corporate profits is often quite substantial unless offset by investment incentives and tax holidays. Similarly, the export tax will reduce the often large-scale investment necessary to develop export- Taxes affect output directly by changing the marginal productivity of capital and labor, and indirectly, by changing the supply of factors. The combined effects may be estimated using Column (4) in Table 1 (the direct effect) and Column (2) in Table 3 tax is estimated to have no effect on CDI' growth or investment.
These estimates can be used to predict how output growth would be affected by a revenue neutral change in the structure of taxation. The effect on output growth of cutting the import, export, personal, and corporate tax rates by 20 percent and replacing the lost revenue by the domestic sales tax is simply the measures calculated above since output growth is predicted to be unaffected by the sales or consumption tax. A revenue neutral shift from the personal tax to the sales tax, for example, '2These estimates are based on holding revenue (or tax effort) constant.
is estimated to increase output growth by 0.40 percentage points.
What were the costs of the increased tax effort between 1965-73 and 1974-82? Evidence from column (2) in Table 1 suggests that the tax instruments that governments used to increase tax effort lead to a sharp decline in output growth; the direct effect of increasing the tax effort by 5 percentage points was a 0.9 percentage point decline in output growth rates (5x.187, from above). Accounting for the indirect positive effect of tax revenue on investment attenuates this measure by 0.3 (5x.498x.12, where .498 is the coefficient from Column 2, Table 3 
IV. Conclusion
This paper has presented a framework for measuring how the structure of taxation and government spending affect output growth. It is shown that when countries are not following a steady-state growth path, static and dynamic tax distortions will affect output growth. In particular, taxes can affect output by (1) reducing the marginal productivity of capital and labor, and (2) reducing the supply of capital and labor.
Government expenditures also provide positive benefits; thus even taxinduced distortions may be justified by the positive benefits of government programs financed by the additional revenue. This paper allows this this tradeoff to be evaluated by including both government spending and tax variables in an econometric model explaining output growth.
The model was tested using 31 African countries during the periods 1965-73 and 1974-82 . It was found that the tax structure was an important determinant of output growth; personal and corporate taxation reduce output growth, while import, export, and coporate taxes discourage investment.
Although the costs of tax-financed government investment were justified by its high marginal productivity during the period 1965-73, the sharp decline in marginal productivity after 1973 suggested that tax-financed public investment during 1974-82 reduced output growth rates.
The distortionary costs of taxation differ depending on whether trade, indirect, or direct taxation is used. In particular, a revenue neutral shift away from personal, corporate, and import taxes to domestic sales (or consumption based) taxes is predicted to increase output growth.
One difficulty with this estimation exercise is the accurate construction of the data. In particular, the effective tax base is difficult to derive; even if, for example, corporate profits could be determined, the appropriate corporate tax base would still be adjusted by depreciation allowances and investment tax credits. Furthermore, tax rates are rarely proportional so that the calculated average ratios may understate the effective marginal rate.
All studies explaining how government expenditure and tax policies "explain" GDP growth rates suffer from a potential endogeneity problem, since government policies themselves will be strongly affected by economic conditions. Bolnick (1978) has made a first step in this direction, but a full simultaneous model of government policy and output growth remains to be developed.
This paper indicates that differences in tax policy can explain a substantial degree of variation in output growth among African countries.
While measurement error and the potential for excluded variables suggest that the regression results be interpreted cautiously, the results imply that the structure, and not simply the level, of taxation can play a important role for encouraging growth in developing economies. This appendix discusses in more detail theoretical and empirical aspects of models which measure the effect of government fiscal policies on output growth rates.
The Production Function Model and Basic Results
There are two sets of assumptions that one can make about the production functions H and F. The first is that they exhibit constant returns to scale, which ensures a balanced growth path in the neoclassical paradigm. The disadvantage of this assumption is that if factor shares are equal, only one or the other sector will produce anything at all, except in the knife-edge case where output prices lead to both goods being produced.
If factor shares do differ, then tax-induced sectoral output shifts will be accompanied by changes in the relative price of capital and labor, depending on whether the taxed sector is more or less capital intensive than the untaxed sector. It is these shifts in relative prices which can lead to the seemingly paradoxical result that an output tax can increase the marginal productivity of capital, although the marginal product of labor will fall by a sufficient amount that total output will still be reduced by the distortionary tax.
The alternative assumption about F and H is that there is an implicit fixed factor --say, land, or human capital --that leads to decreasing returns to scale. This assumption gives rise to a concave production possibility frontier (holding factor prices constant) between the output of F and the output of H. While this assumption has intuitive plausability, its steady-state properties are undesirable unless one assumes that the fixed factors grow over time at the exogenously determined population growth rate. In sum, the model indicates that tax policy will have no effect on One complication that should be mentioned is the presence of revenue from, for example, an import tax. In the context of the three period model above, the import tax would have two effects. First, it would provide revenue on a tax base which is not measured in GDP. One way to handle this problem is to consider exports as an inputtt into the purchases of imported goods. To the extent that imports are purchased using foreign currency obtained from exports, a higher tax on imports simply implies that more exports must be sold to purchase a given quantity of imports.
The second effect is that an import tax will distort the price of the domestic manufactured goods by providing protection. Thus if domestic manufacturing and imported manufacturing were perfect substitutes, the import tax would be equivalent to a subsidy for the manufacturing sector, so that an increase in domestic manufacturing output would effectively reduce tax revenue from imports.
Issues in the Measurement of Constant Price GDP
One difficulty with the estimation of CDP equations is the definition of constant prices. In the example above, import tariffs lead to higher prices for tradeable goods. However, if the tariffs had been in effect since the price indices were begun, then the value of domestic manufacturing would be overstated, since they would be valued at the protected price rather than the world (or potential import) price (Kreuger, 1984) .
A related problem with the constant price series is the manner in 37 which changes in tax rates are reflected in the price index. If income taxes are collected in the taxed sector, some of the tax will be shifted to the firm; and in turn some of that tax will ultimately be shifted to consumers. If such a price rise is corrected in the constant price series, then the retorted price will appear not to rise. Hence the methods used for calculating constant price series, and the extent to which indirect taxes are shifted to consumers, can potentially affect the estimation results in ways that are difficult to determine.
Whether GDP should be measured at factor cost or at market prices is a difficult question. This paper uses factor cost measures where available to follow the convention that factor cost measures output measured at producer prices, and not at potentially arbitrary consumer prices reflecting any indirect tax rates. 
